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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

CONSENTABLE LINES IN PENNSYLVANIA
Boundary disputes have long been settled in Pennsylvania by the establishment of consentable lines. The first case dealing with consentable lines in this state
was that of Perkins v. Gay.' In the course of the opinion Justice Gibson said that
consentable lines had long been recognized in this Commonwealth; however, there
was no indication in the opinion of the origin of the term.
Consentable Line-Definition
None of the cases give a concise definition of a consentable line. Webster's
New International Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1943) defines "consentable" as "assent
to or express agreement upon a boundary," and mentions collaterally that it is a
word used in law in Pennsylvania. The word "line" is defined by the same authority
as "a division between estates". Joining the two, the definition of a cons-entable line
is a boundary or division between estates assented to or expressly agreed upon by
the parties owning the separate estates.
Almost all of the other jurisdictions in the United States recognize such
division lines but in no other jurisdiction is there any mention of the term "consentable line".
Requisites of a Consentable Line
The case of Newton v. Smith2 held that there were three requisites for the
,stablishment of a binding consentable line: first, there must be a dispute; second,
the establishment of a line settling the dispute; and third, the consent of both the
parties to that line and the giving up of respective claims which are inconsistent
therewith. The Perkins case adds that there must be full disclosure and good faith
and that there must be occupation in conformity with the line so established. All
of the Pennsylvania cases which have held that the parties are bound by a consentable line agree that these elements must be present.8
The cases are rigid in requiring that there be an existing dispute before the
agreement is binding. In discussing the necessity of an existing dispute, the court
stated in the Perkins case that the agreement is a compromise in which each party
supposes that he gives up something to which he is strictly entitled for the sake
of peace.
In the matter of establishing the line settling the dispute, the cases are not
quite so pointed. None of the cases set forth the formalities to be followed in the
establishment of the line. It appears from the facts in most of the cases that the
usual formalities observed in establishing the line are: first, the going out upon
1

Perkins v. Gay, 3 S. & R. 327 (Pa. 1817).

2 Newton v. Smith, 40 Pa. Super. 615 (1909).

8 Perkins v. Gay, supra; Caputo v. Mariatti, 113 Pa. Super. 314, 173 A. 770 (1934) ; Beals
v. Allison, 161 Pa. Super. 125, 54 A.2d 84 (1947); Adamson v. Potts, 4 Pa. 234 (1846); McCoy
v. Hutchison, 8 W. & S. 66 (Pa. 1844); H. E. Davis v. J. B. Russell, 142 Pa. 426, 21 A. 870
(1891) ; 69 A. L R. 1478n.
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the land by the parties; second, the agreement by them as to where the line should
be on the land itself, e.g., so many feet from a fence or in line with trees or the
like; and third, the occupation of the land by the parties in accordance therewith.
The agreement is usually parol; the parties seldom intend that it should be reduced
to writing.
It is apparent that the consent of the parties to be bound by the agreement
and, consequently, to give up their respective claims which are inconsistent therewith, is a necessary requirement for the establishment of a consentable line, since
there can be no binding agreement without a meeting of the minds.
The courts do not discuss the requirement of full disclosure and good faith
but it seems that both would be required because of the nature of the agreement;
that is, since the line is a matter of compromise and the parties are giving up what
may be a valuable claim for the sake of peace, they should be protected from the
schemes of their neighbors. Another reason for th- requirement of good faith is
to encourage the settling of disputes in this manner since it effects a speedy settlement of the matter and reduces the burden on the courts.
Although the cases do not give a reason for requiring occupation in conformity
with the new line, it would seem that this is the best evidence of the parties' consent to the new line and of their relinquishment of any inconsistent claims. This is
sufficient reason for the requirement.
The Intention Required of Mhe Parties
The most concise statement of the requisite intent of the parties can be found
in the case of Beals v. Allison 4 The court there stated that in order to establish a
binding consentable line the parties must intend to create a new line and not merely
to locate a pre-existing one. This statement is in accord with thePerkins case and
with the H. E. Davis v. 1. B. Russell case. 5 The latter held that if thWe parties establish a line as their boundary not to settle a dispute but merely in an attempt to
locate their already existing boundary, and the line so Lestablished is not in fact
their boundary, such line will not b1 binding on the parties since there is no agreement and no consent thereto.
Considerationfor the Agreement-Why Required
McCoy v. Hutchison6 and Hagey v. Detweiler7 hold that the consideration
for the agreement is the compromise of the doubtful right and the giving up by
the parties of their respective claims. The holding of the Perkins case is that the
peace resulting from the establishment of the compromise line is sufficient consideration.
Supra, note 3.
5 Supra, note 3.

4

6 Supra, note 3.

7 Hagey v. Detweiler, 35 Pa. 409 (1860).
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The courts look for consideration since they seemingly base their decision that
the parties are bound by the agreement on some contractual ground. Many of the
cases do not explain the theory on which their decision is based but the cases of
Syphus v. Meighen8 and Newton v. Smith9 rely on estoppel by agreement.
Effect of the Statute of Frauds
Although thL effect of the Statute of Frauds'0 on the establishment of consentable lines by parol is not discussed in most of the opinions, this question was
raised in the case of Hagey v. Detweiler.11 There the court said:
"The statute (Statute of Frauds) is a rule of conveyance; it requires
a writing to create an estate or interest in lands that shall have more force
or effect than a lease or estate at will only. But adjoining owners who
adjust their division line by parol, do not create or convey any estate
whatever between themselves; no such thought or intention influences
their conduct; after their boundary is fixed by consent they hold up2 to it
by virtue of their title deeds, and not by virtue of parol transfer."'
Although this specific question was not before the court in Beals v. Allison,i3
it is therein stated that it has long been established in Pennsylvania that a consentable line which has been established by parol will be binding on the parties.
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the establishment of a
consentable line is not within the Statute of Frauds because it is not a conveyance
of land but rather a determination of the geographical extent of the estates of the
adjoining land owners, as described by their respective deeds.
Who Is Bound By a Consentable Line
That a consentable line is binding as between the original parties is not in
doubt; all of the Pennsylvania cases hold this as of course. Once the courts find
that a valid consentable line has been established they hold, without looking to
anything else, that the parties to the agreement are bound thereby.
The problem as to the effect of consentable lines arises when dealing with the
grantees of the parties to the agreement. In this situation two questions present
themselves; first, the necessity of notice on the part of the grantees; and second, if
notice is required, whether it need be actual or whether it may be implied from the
conditions as they exist at the time of the sale of the land.
In many cases the question of whether or not the grantees of the original
parties to the agreement are bound by the agreement is not discussed. It seems to
be assumed that if there is a valid consentable line binding the original parties, it
8 Syphus v. Meighen, 22 Pa. 125 (1853).
9 Supra, note 2.
10 Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 389, 33 PS 1.

11 Supra, note 7.
12 Parenthesis supplied.
1 Beals v. Allison, 161 Pa. Super. 125, 54 A.2d 84 (1947).
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will also be binding on the grantees. A review of the cases will show the various
views which the Pennsylvania courts have taken on the question.
In the Perkins case, one of the parties to the action was a grantee of an original
party to the agreement. No mention was made of the question and the grantee was
treated as though he had been a party to the agreement. Again, in McCoy v. Hutchinson, 1" the grantees were held to be bound by the agreement. Grogan v. Leike18
was another case in which the parties were grantees and again there was no mention
of the problem of notice and the parties were held to be bound by the line. In
Hagey v. Detweiler"6 it was stated that the purchaser from one who had agreed to
a consentable line took in accordance with such line if he took with notice, and in
this case the court found that the purchaser had taken with notice since a wall was
built on the agreed line.
In Morrison v. Howell 17 there had been a dispute between M and B as to the
location of their boundary line; a consentable line was established and later affirmed in the presence of H, who subsequently bought from B, and H made improvements. Later, M sold part of the land which had been in dispute. M's vendee
brought ejectment against H. The court held that since M could not have claimed
the land prior to this conveyance, his vendee could not claim it. The court went
on to say that since H had been in possession at the time of the conveyance by M,
and since he had made improvements on the land, M's vendee should have made
inquiry; since he did not, he was held estopped to make any contrary claim. The
case seems to leave the question of necessity of notice unanswered, for it holds that
the vendee is bound by the line because M was so bound; further, that M's vendee
had notice from the improvements on the land, indicating that if notice were required, constructive notice from the physical appearance of the land and its occupancy would satisfy the requirement.
In the later case of Dawson v. CoulterI g the court said:
"The general rule is that one who claims title to property through
another, regardless of the nature of the transfer whether by the act of the
parties or the act of law, is bound by earlier act or declarations of his
predecessor and takes title cum onere: Gibblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle
437; Floyd v. Kulp Lumber Co., 222 Pa. 257. Under this rule all acts and
declarations of the owner of land made during the continuance of his
interest tending to show the character or extent of his possession or interest, or the location of boundaries, are competent evidence not only
against himself but also against those who claim through or under him:
Heister v. Laird, 1 W. & S. 245; Gibblehouse v. Stong, 3 Rawle 437;
Gratz v. Beats, 45 Pa. 495; Henry's TRIAL EVIDENCE § 88, 91."
14 McCoy v. Hutchison, 8 W. & S. 66 (Pa.

1844).

Is Grogan v. Leike, 22 Pa. Super. 59 (1902).
16 Supra, note 7.
17 Morrison v. Howell,

37 Pa. 58 (1860).
18 Dawson v. Coulter, 262 Pa. 566, 106 A. 187 (1918).
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The footnote to the case of Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928)
at 69 A.L.R. 1478 states:
"It may be stated as a general rule, where a disputed, uncertain, or
unascertained boundary is settled by parol agreement, and such agreement
is followed by occupation in accordance therewith, it is binding not only
on the immediate parties to the agreement, but also on those claiming
under them."
As authority for this statement the following Pennsylvania cases were cted:
Brown v. Caldwell' and Morriion v. Howell.21
Tiffany on Real Property § 653 (3rd Ed. 1939) states that the grantee of the
original party to the agreement will be bound, citing cases confirming this statement. He goes on to say that notice to the grantees is required; however he cites no
cases to support this last statement.

Thus it may be seen that the cases do not specifically hold that notice to the
grantees is required in order to bind them by the agreement; nor are writers on the
subject in accord as to the necessity of this element.
The few cases which do mention notice are those in which notice was obvious
and the courts found constructive notice from the appearance of the land. It may
be that notice was used only as an additional reason for binding the grantees. None
of the cases which discussed the matter held that the grantees were not bound
simply because they had no notice. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty what
the result would have been had this element not been present.
The majority of the cases do not discuss notice; nor did it appear from the
facts that notice was present. This seems to indicate that the court will not look for
notice and consequently will not require it.
Dawson v. Coulter2l decided later that any of the cases which mentioned
notice, indicates that notice to the grantees would not be required since the parties
take their title curm onere and therefore the extent of the grantee's interest is
limited to that of the grantor.
If notice was required some anomolous situations could result; a party to the
agreement could sell his land and thereby render the agreement a nullity by the
simple expedient of not notifying the vendee of the agreement; also, if both
parties should convey, a situation could arise in which one grantee would be bound
by the agreement and the other not bound. If these results were permitted, the
consideration for the agreement would fail because the dispute would never be
permanently settled. Therefore, it seems logical that the vendee should be bound
by the agreement regardless of notice.
19 Brown v. Caldwell, 10 S. & L. 114 (Pa. 1823).
20 Supra, note

21

17.
Supra, note 18.
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Because of the reasons mentioned above and the indications of the majority
and later cases, it is submitted that the courts should hold a grantee of an original
party to the agreement bound by the boundary established regardless of whether
or not the grantee had notice. However, the question is still an open one.
Summary
Summarizing the foregoing material, it appears that the essential requirements
for the establishment of a binding consentable line are:
1. There must be an existing dispute as to the location of thL boundary.
2. The line must be established to settle the dispute; this is the consideration
for the agreement.
3. Both parties must consent to the line and must give up claims which are
inconsistent therewith. This must be evidenced by occupation of the land
in accordance with the line thus established.
4. There must be full disclosure on both sides and the parties must act in
good faith.
5. The intention of the parties must be to establish a new boundary and not
to locate an already existing one.
Several of the cases have discussed the necessity of notice to a grantee before
the grantee becomes bound by the agreement. However, the majority of the cases
do not mention notice in this respect. Writers on the subject are also in conflict on
this point. Although it is still an open question as to whether or not a grantee must
have notice of the agreement to be bound thereby, it is believed that such notice
will not be required.
George M. Elsesser, Jr.

